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Various and discordant readings, glosses and commentaries
[on statutes], will inevitably arise in the progress of time, and,
perhaps, as often from the want of skill and talent in those who
comment, as in those who make the law.1
In January of 1931, Warner Brothers-First National released a
film entitled Little Caesar.2 Based on a book by W. R. Burnett,3
* William J. and Dorothy O'Neill Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. A.B.
1957, J.D. 1960, University of Notre Dame. Professor Blakey is also a Vice-Chairperson of
the RICO Cases Committee of the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Associa-
tion. Professor Blakey was the Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws
and Procedures of the United States Senate in 1969-1970 when the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act of 1970, Title IX ("known as RICO"), was drafted and enacted.
J. KENT, COMMNTARIES ON AAERiCAN LAW 520-21 (9th ed. 1854).
2 Little Caesar (Wisconsin/Warner Bros. Screenplay Series 1931). See generally Blakey
& Perry, An Analysis of the Myths that Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO, and the Various
Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God-Is This the End of RICO?" (pts. 1-3), 43 VAND. L.
REv. 851, 982-87 (1990) [hereinafter Myths].
3 W. BuRN=r, LrrrLE CAESAR (1929).
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the movie, loosely portraying the life of Alphonse Capone,4 starred
Edward G. Robinson in its title role, Caesar Enrico Bandello, also
known as "Little Caesar," or "Rico."' 5 Robinson, as he lies dying,
utters one of the most famous end lines in film history: "Mother of
Mercy-Is this the end of Rico?" 6 Likewise, no one who looks at
this Symposium-or others 7-or the seemingly inevitable march of
RICO reform (chloroform?) legislation through Congresss-or the
endless efforts of the federal judiciary to narrow the statute9-can
help but endlessly wonder, "Is this the end of RICO?"
This Symposium, with its wide-ranging lead articles and its
craftsman-like student pieces, provides an excellent overview of
the statute, and opinions for-and against-it.
I. BACKGROUND OF RICO10
In 1970, Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act,
Myths, supra note 2, at 983 n.437.
5 Id. at 984 n.438.
Id. at n.439.
See generally Symposium, Reforming RICO: If, Why, and How?, 43 VAND. L. REV.
621 (1990); Symposium, Law and the Continuing Enterprise: Perspectives on RICO, 65 No-
TE DAME L. REV. 872 (1990).
a See S. REP. No. 269, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990) (reporting S. 430); 6 Civil RICO
Rep. 1 (Sept. 25, 1990) (noting the reporting of H.R. 5111).
1 See, e.g., Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639,
913 F.2d 948, 952-56 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (adopting narrowest available rule for resolution
of RICO issues), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-872 (Dec. 3, 1990). Although concurring in
the judgment, Judge Mikva argued that the majority's interpretation of RICO "contravenes
the very broad words of the statute and the apparent intent of its drafters," as well as
precedent of the Supreme Court. Id. at 957 (Mikva, J., concurring). For a discussion and
critique of the trend to limit the application of RICO, see infra notes 68-72 and accompany-
ing text.
10 "Background of RICO" reflects a suitably objective title appropriate for a foreword.
Nevertheless, a caveat is in order: "[A]ny man who says he is impartial about any subject on
which he speaks is either ignorant of the subject or a liar, and.., the honest man is one
who, aware of his partiality, guards against its abuse." Shaw, Labor Law for the Average
Lawyer's Practice, LAB. L. J. 122, 122 (Nov. 1949) (paraphrasing Justice Holmes). For fuller
discussions of the origins and underlying concepts of RICO, see generally Blakey, The RICO
Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflection on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NoTE DAME L. REv. 237
(1982) [hereinafter Civil Fraud]; Blakey & Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Re-
flections on Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only
Against White Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 526 (1987) [hereinafter Equitable
Relief]; Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic
Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980); see also ORGANIZED
CRIME AND RACKETEERING SEC., CRIM. Div., U.S. DrPT OF JUSTICE, RACKETEER INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO): A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS (3d rev. ed.
1990). For opposing views on the history, scope, and effectiveness of the RICO Act, compare
Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal (pts. 1-4), 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 920 (1987),
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Title IX of which is known as the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act ("RICO")." Congress enacted the 1970 Act
"to strengthen[] the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
[to] establish[] new penal prohibitions, and [to] provide[e][] en-
hanced sanctions and new remedies .. ."I' RICO covers violence,
the provision of illegal goods and services, corruption in labor or
management relations, corruption in government, and criminal
fraud.13 Congress found that "the sanctions or remedies available"
under the law as it existed in 1970 were "unnecessarily limited in
scope and impact."' 4 Congress then provided a wide range of new
criminal and civil sanctions to control these offenses, including im-
prisonment, forfeiture, injunctions, and treble damage relief for
"person[s] injured" in their "business or property" by violations of
the statute.' 5 At the time, these sanctions were called for by no less
than the President, 6 the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and the Administration of Justice, 17 and the American Bar
Association.'"
The near-universal approval of the Act was evidenced by the
overwhelming majorities in both houses that voted for it. The Sen-
ate passed the bill seventy-three to one.19 The House passed an
and Lynch, A Reply to Michael Goldsmith, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 802 (1988) with Goldsmith,
RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A Response to Gerard E. Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 774
(1988).
n Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
12 84 Stat. 923 (1970).
'" Civil Fraud, supra note 10, at 300-06.
14 84 stat. 923 (1970).
25 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963, 1964(c) (1988). It is widely believed that the treble damage provi-
sions were a "late addition, spot-welded to an already fully-structured criminal statute."
P.M.F. Servs., Inc. v. Grady, 681 F. Supp. 549, 555 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (Shadur, J). Judge
Shadur's views, first expressed in Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576, 581-84
(N.D. Ill. 1983), were followed by the Second Circuit in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc.,
741 F.2d 482, 488-90 (2d Cir. 1984), which was reversed by the Supreme Court, 473 U.S. 479
(1985). As such, their precedential value now is in considerable doubt. Religious Technology
Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103
(1987). They are also plainly wrong. See generally Equitable Relief, supra note 10, at 249-
80; Myths, supra note 2, at 864 n.29.
, "Message on Organized Crime," reprinted in Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Bess. 449
(1969).
17 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORcEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SoCIETY 208 (1967).
's Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S.30 Before the Subcomm. No. 5, House
Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 537 (1970).
19 116 CONG. REC. 972 (1970).
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amended bill 431 to 26.20 The Senate then passed the House bill,
after debate, but without objection,2 and the President signed the
legislation on October 15, 1970.22
The innovative approach to crime control embodied in RICO
also is reflected in legislation adopted by a majority of state legisla-
tures. Since 1970, twenty-nine states have enacted similar RICO
legislation.23
A. Standards of Unlawful Conduct: Criminal and Civil
1. Standards
RICO sets out "standards" of "unlawful" conduct, which are
enforced through "criminal" and "civil" sanctions. Section 1963 of
Title 18 provides the criminal remedies. Section 1964 of Title 18
provides the civil remedies. Section 1962 explicitly states what is
"unlawful," as opposed to what is "criminal." As such, RICO is
not, as some believe, "primarily a criminal statute. '24 Accordingly,
because the civil scope of RICO is broader than its criminal scope,
RICO is not primarily criminal and punitive, but preventative and
remedial.2" RICO's civil remedies, based on a showing of a prepon-
derance of the evidence, are available to the government and other
parties.26
2. Liberal Construction
Congress directed that RICO "be liberally construed to effec-
20 Id. at 35,363.
21 Id. at 36,296.
2 Id. at 37,264.
2 The first state to pass its own "little RICO" statute was Hawaii in May, 1972. The
most recent was Minnesota in August, 1989. See Myths, supra note 2, at 988-1011 (1990)
(chart in appendix analyzing laws of various states).
14 In re Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 849 (E.D. Va. 1983); see 116
CONG. REc. 602 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska) ("the principal value of this legislation
may well be found to exist in its civil provisions"); 115 CONG. REC. 6993 (1969) (statement of
Sen. Hruska) ("the criminal provisions are intended primarily as an adjunct to the civil
provisions, which I consider as the more important feature of the bill").
"6 Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985) ("read broadly ... to
'effectuate its remedial purposes' "); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981)
(RICO is "both preventive and remedial").
26 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 492 ("no indication. . depart from [preponderance]"); Wilcox
v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 815 F.2d 522, 530-32 (9th Cir. 1987) (private suit);




tuate its remedial purposes. 2 7 This liberal construction clause sets
RICO apart from the bulk of federal criminal law. As the Supreme
Court noted in Russello v. United States, "this is the only sub-
stantive federal criminal statute that contains such a directive.
2 8
The directive is a "mandate. ' 29 Accordingly, courts are required by
the statute to read its language in the same fashion, whatever the
character of the suit.3
0
3. No Supersession
While broad, RICO does not displace other bodies of law, fed-
eral or state. RICO was, of course, an innovation. As the Supreme
Court noted in United States v. Turkette, "Congress was well
aware that it was [with RICO] entering a new domain. . .. ,31 The
issue was not whether RICO should apply to the conduct prohib-
ited by its predicate offenses, but whether it should preempt other
laws. Congress, however, expressly saved "provision[s] of Federal,
State, or other law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil
27 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
28 464 U.S. 16, 27 (1983). The liberal construction clause is not unique in state law. It
had its origins in the codification movement of the 19th century. Judicial hostility to change
through legislation was common at that time.
[W]here [judges] were not ready boldly to declare [it] unconstitutional, [they were
ready] to interpret it so restrictively as to narrow its effect.
These factors found expression in the abstract canons of statutory interpreta-
tions . . . strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law; strict
construction of penal statutes, or of legislation that imposed "drastic" burdens, or
of legislation that imposed special damages ....
The effect was to put a primarily obstructive, if not destructive connotation
on the process of statutory interpretation.
J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERIcAN LAW 186 (1950). Legislatures reacted. "[I]t became
standard practice in drafting statutes to insert a preamble stating broadly the purpose of
the act and to close with a provision declaring that the statute should be liberally con-
strued." D. WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 174 (1974). In fact, a majority of
states have abolished the common law rule. The statutes are collected in Civil Fraud, supra
note 10, at 245 n.25. See generally Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Criminal Stat-
utes, 48 HARv. L. REV. 748 (1935); Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66
CORNELL L. Rnv. 167 (1980).
29 Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 737 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988)
(quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 492 n.10).
11 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 489; cf. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 401
(1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The words cannot be read one way in a suit which is to end
in fine and imprisonment and another way in one which seeks an injunction"); United
States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823, 830 (Cir. Ct., S.D.N.Y. 1906) ("the same
facts and acts which expose violators of [antitrust act] . . . to civil suit also render them
subject to indictment").
2" 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981).
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remedies in addition to those provided for" in RICO.32 The Sev-
enth Circuit succinctly captured RICO's aim when it held that
"Congress enacted RICO in order to supplement, not supplant,
the available remedies since it thought those remedies offered too
little protection for the victims. s3 3 The Supreme Court itself ac-
knowledged that such overlap between statutes "is neither unusual
nor unfortunate."' " The existence of cumulative remedies furthers
remedial purposes. 5
4. Elements of Section 1962 Violations
Section 1962(a). The standards of section 1962(a) embody
four essential elements: (1) income derived from a "pattern" of
racketeering (2) used or invested in the acquisition, establishment,
or operation by a defendant (3) of an "enterprise" (4) engaged in
or affecting interstate commerce.36
Section 1962(b). The standards of section 1962(b) embody
three essential elements: (1) the acquisition or maintenance
through a "pattern" of racketeering activity by a defendant (2) of
an interest in or control of an "enterprise" (3) engaged in or affect-
ing interstate commerce.3 7
Section 1962(c). The standards of section 1962(c) embody four
essential elements: (1) employment by or association of a defend-
ant with (2) an "enterprise" (3) engaged in or affecting interstate
commerce (4) the affairs of which are conducted or participated in
by a defendant through a "pattern" of racketeering activity.38
32 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
11 Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 392 (7th
Cir. 1984), afld, 473 U.S. 606 (1985) (emphasis added).
" See S.E.C. v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969).
35 Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 (1983).
36 See, e.g., Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1396-98
(9th Cir. 1986).
The Supreme Court provided its authoritative analysis of "pattern" in H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989). The best two pre-Northwestern Bell
analyses of "pattern" appear in Goldsmith, RICO and Pattern, 73 CORNE L L. REV. 971
(1988) and Note, Reconsideration of Pattern in Civil RICO Offenses, 62 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 83 (1986).
The best single analysis of "enterprise" is in Note, Functions of RICO Enterprise Con-
cept, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 646 (1989).
37 See, e.g., Medallion Television Enters., Inc. v. SelecTV of Cal., Inc., 833 F.2d 1360,
1362 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3241 (1989).
38 See, e.g., Sun Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir. 1987)
("Liability under § 1962(c) requires (1) the conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pat-
tern (4) of racketeering activity") (citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496).
[Vol. 64:701
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Section 1962(d). Section 1962(d) is the conspiracy provision of
RICO. Section 1962(d) makes it "unlawful for any person to con-
spire to violate [subsections (a), (b), or (c)]." ' 9
B. The Criminal Enforcement Mechanism
The criminal enforcement mechanism of RICO provides for
imprisonment, fines, and criminal forfeiture. RICO authorizes im-
prisonment of up to twenty years, or life, where the predicate of-
fense authorizes life.40 In conjunction with other sections of United
States Code, Title 18, RICO authorizes fines for RICO violations of
up to $250,000 if an individual is convicted,41 or up to $500,000 if
an entity is convicted,42 or alternatively, twice the gain or loss. 43
Sentencing courts can also order defendants to pay restitution to
victims of an offense.4 RICO itself mandates that forfeiture can be
of illicit proceeds, related property, or any interest in an
enterprise.45
C. The Civil Enforcement Mechanism
The civil enforcement mechanism of RICO provides for in-
junctions, treble damages, and counsel fees. The civil enforcement
provisions were modeled on, but are not identical to, the antitrust
laws.46 The antitrust laws are termed "the Magna Carta of free en-
terprise. '47 The antitrust laws "are as important to the preserva-
tion of economic freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill
of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal free-
doms. '4s A private "treble-damages remedy [is needed] ...pre-
39 See, e.g., United States v. Tille, 729 F.2d 615, 619-20 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
845 (1984). See generally Note, Conspiracy to Violate RICO, 58 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1001
(1983).
40 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988).
41 Id. § 1963(a) (violators "shall be fined under this title"). Section 3571(b) provides for
fines that an individual may be sentenced to pay.
42 Id. § 3571(c).
43 Id. § 3571(d).
" See id. §§ 3556, 3663-64.
41 Id. § 1963. See generally Blakey, Asset Forfeiture Under Federal Criminal Law, in
H. ALEXANDER & G. CArEN, THE PoLrrcs AND ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZED CRIM 127 (1985);
Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 708 (1977) (historical review
of forfeiture law).
46 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 56-60 (1970).
7 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
48 Id.
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cisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to anti-
trust violations. '49 Such "private antitrust litigation is one of the
surest weapons for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws."5
Private suits "provide a significant supplement to the limited re-
sources available to the Department of Justice" to enforce the an-
titrust statutes.5' Like the antitrust laws, RICO creates "a private
enforcement mechanism that . . . deter[s] violators and provide[s]
ample compensation to the victims. '5 2 In fact, RICO and the anti-
trust statutes are well integrated.5 3
49Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (emphasis in original).
50 Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 59 (1965) (quoting Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318 (1965)).
5 Reiter, 442 U.S. at 344. In fact, between 1960 and 1980, of the 22,585 civil and crimi-
nal cases brought under the antitrust provision by the government or private parties, 84%
were instituted by private plaintiffs. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE SOURCE BOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 431 (1981). Professor (now Judge)
Posner also forcefully argues on economic grounds for private enforcement of more than
actual damages awards against all forms of deliberate antisocial conduct, particularly where
the factor of concealment is present. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 462 (private
enforcement), 143, 272 (more than actual damage awards for deliberate conduct), 235 (con-
cealment) (2d ed. 1977). See generally Staff of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (review of argument for and against and empirical studies of antitrust
treble damage claims for relief); Equitable Relief, supra note 10, at 531 n.17 (history and
rationale of treble damages); Block, Nold & Sidak, The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust En-
forcement, 89 J. POL. EcoN. 429, 440 (1981) ("Neither imprisonment nor monetary penalties
pose[] a credible threat ... [T]he deterrent effect [comes] ... from ... treble damages");
Sullivan, Breaking Up the Treble Play: Attacks on the Private Treble Damage Antitrust
Action, 14 SErON HALL 17, 17-18 (1983) ("treble damages remedy for private plaintiffs offers
unique advantages in the scheme of antitrust enforcement").
51 Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982); see also Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) ('private attorneys general'
[for] a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inade-
quate"); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241 (1987) ("vigorous
incentives for plaintiffs to pursue RICO claims"); Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S.
479, 493 (1985) ("private attorney general provision ... designed to fill prosecutorial gaps")
(citing Reiter, 442 U.S. at 344).
53 "There are three possible kinds of force which a firm can resort to: violence (or
threat of it), deception, or market power." C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 17
(1959). RICO focuses on the first two; antitrust focuses on the third. See American Column
& Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 414 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Re-
straint may be exerted through force or fraud or agreement"); Mosler v. S/P Enters., Inc.,
888 F.2d 1138, 1143-44 (7th Cir. 1989) (RICO fraud).
Because [such] frauds are concealable, trebling is important to produce proper
incentives .... If perpetrators pay what they took when they get caught, and
keep the proceeds the rest of the time, then fraud is profitable. If victims recoup
only what they lost, and face the burdens and uncertainties of the legal process
plus the costs of their own counsel, then victory will not make them whole, and
the shortfall may mean that victims will not vigorously investigate and litigate.
Trebling [under RICO] addresses both halves of this equation.
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D. Organized Crime and Beyond
The drafting of RICO began, but did not end, with an effort to
sanction organized crime's traditional activities. The "legislative
history [of RICO] clearly demonstrates that . . . [it] was intended
to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault
upon organized crime and its economic roots. '5 4 As the Supreme
Court noted in United States v. Turkette, "the major purpose of
Title IX. . . [was] to address the infiltration of legitimate business
by organized crime," but the statute is not limited to infiltration:
Congress wanted to reach both "legitimate" and "illegitimate" en-
terprises.5 5 The Supreme Court put it well recently in H. J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.:
[The notion that RICO is limited to organized crime] finds no
support in the Act's text, and is at odds with the tenor of its legis-
lative history .... Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a
more general statute, one which, although it had organized crime
as its focus, was not limited in application to organized crime.5
The legislative history of the 1970 statute is replete with state-
ments by the bill's sponsors that fully demonstrate that they in-
tended that it apply beyond organized crime. Representative Rob-
ert McClory, a floor manager of RICO, stated:
[E]very effort ... [was] made [in drafting RICO] to produce a
strong and effective tool with which to combat organized
crime-and at the same time deal fairly with all who might be
affected by... [the] legislation-whether part of the crime syndi-
cate or not.
57
Id. See generally Note, Treble Damages Under RICO: Characterization and Computation,
61 NoTRE DAm L. REV. 526, 533-34 (1986). The purposes of the treble damages provision
are to "(1) encourage private citizens to bring RICO actions, (2) deter future violators, and
(3) compensate victims for all accumulative harm. These multiple and convergent purposes
make the treble damage provision a powerful mechanism in the effort to vindicate the inter-
ests of those victimized by crime." Id.
Russello, 464 U.S. at 26.
" Turkette, 452 U.S. at 590-91. The Fourth Circuit similarly commented: "[R]ejected
[also has been the] notion [that RICO] applies only to organized crime in the classic 'mob-
ster' sense." United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1030 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
919 (1980).
1 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2903-05 (1989); see also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495 ("not just mob-
sters"); Owl Constr. Co. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 727 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984) ("[Clourts and.., commentators have persuasively and ex-
haustively explained why .... RICO ... [is not limited to] organized crime").
11 116 CONG. REc. 35,204 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Robert McClory).
1990]
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As the Supreme Court observed in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., "[Legitimate businesses] enjoy neither an inherent incapacity
for criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences."58 Ac-
cordingly, RICO fits easily into a consistent pattern of federal leg-
islation enacted as general reform over the past half century or
more aimed at a specific target, but drafted without limiting it to
the specific target.5"
E. Implementation of Public Criminal and Civil RICO
At first, the Department of Justice moved slowly to use RICO
in criminal prosecutions. Today, it is the prosecutor's tool of choice
against sophisticated forms of crime.60 The Department of Justice
is also beginning to implement the civil provisions."1 Since 1970,
criminal RICO has been effectively used against:
1. organized crime groups;62
2. political corruption;63
0s 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985). Finally, "the courts [are also] all but unanimous in their
refusal to read RICO as prohibiting only the infiltration of legitimate organizations." United
States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7 (4th Cir. 1980).
50 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988) (extortion), held not limited to racketeering in
United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 373-74 (1978); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1988) (Travel Act),
held not limited to organized crime bribery in Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 46
(1979); 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (1988) (lottery tickets), held not limited to organized crime in
United States v. Fabrizio, 385 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1966); 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1988) (bank
robbery), held not limited to gangsters in Bell v. United States, 462 U.S. 356, 358-62 (1983);
18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1988) (white slave traffic), held not limited to commercial prostitution in
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485-90 (1917). See generally Equitable Relief,
supra note 10, at 529 n.13 (other cases collected); Blakey, Definition of Organized Crime in
Statutes and Law Enforcement Administration, in PREsIDENT's COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED
CRIME: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL-THE IMPAcT: ORGANIZED
CRIME TODAY 511-80 (April, 1986).
'0 See Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 109-11 (1985) (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Ste-
phen S. Trott) [hereinafter Trott Testimony].
01 Id. at 116-17 (litigation against mob-controlled unions reviewed).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Brookier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1982) (RICO pros-
ecution of "members of La Cosa Nostra, a secret national organization engaged in a wide
range of racketeering activities, including murder, extortion, gambling, and loan sharking"),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
" See, e.g., United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 541 (2d Cir. 1988) (conviction of
public officials in N.Y.C. parking scandal); United States v. Mandel, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.
1979) (en banc) (court equally divided) (conviction of governor of Maryland for RICO mail
fraud and bribery), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 461 (1986), conviction vacated, 862 F.2d 1067 (4th
Cir. 1988) (in light of United States v. McNally, 483 U.S. 350 (1988) and 18 U.S.C. § 1346
(1988) (McNally result set aside), passed at, 134 CONG. REC. H11207 (daily ed. Oct. 21,
1988)).
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3. white-collar crime; 4 and
4. violent groups.6 5
Independent studies conclude that RICO is effective against
sophisticated forms of crime. The President's Commission on Or-
ganized Crime praised RICO highly, and it recommended that
states adopt similar legislation.6 6 The General Accounting Office,
too, in its study of federal organized crime prosecutions,
concluded:
Prior to the passage of [RICO], attacking an organized criminal
group was an awkward affair. RICO facilitated the prosecution of
a criminal group involved in superficially unrelated criminal ven-
tures and enterprises connected only at the usually well-insulated
upper levels of the organization's bureaucracy.
... Before the act, the government's efforts were necessarily
piecemeal, attacking isolated segments of the organization as they
engaged in single criminal acts. The leaders, when caught, were
only penalized for what seemed to be unimportant crimes. The
larger meaning of these crimes was lost because the big picture
could not be presented in a single criminal prosecution. With the
passage of RICO, the entire picture of the organization's criminal
behavior and the involvement of its leaders in directing that be-
havior could be captured and presented.67
See, e.g., United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 763-64 (9th Cir. 1980)
(prosecution of Japanese corporation for RICO mail fraud and bribery).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1526-28, 1540, 1546 (9th Cir.
1988) (prosecution of "Order" or "Bruders Schweigen" white-hate group for robbery and
murder of Alan Berg), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866 (1989). See generally S. SINGULAR, TALKED
TO DEATH: THE MURDER OF ALAN BERG AND THE RISE OF THE NEo-NAzIs (1989).
66 PRESmENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL-THE IMPACT. ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY (April 1986). The report con-
cludes that RICO is one of the most powerful and effective weapons in existence for fighting
organized crime. Id. at 133-34.
67 GENERAL ACcOUNTING OFFICE, EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GoVERNMENT's ATTACK ON LA
COSA NoSTRA 14 (April 14, 1988) [hereinafter EFFECTrVENESS], reprinted in, Organized
Crime: 25 Years After Valachi: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investiga-
tions of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 72, 505 (1988)
[hereinafter Organized Crime Hearings]. The Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Inves-
tigations recently concluded that federal law enforcement agencies "should continue, in ap-
propriate and deserving cases, their innovative and effective use of the enterprise theory of
investigation, the task force approach, and the provisions of the RICO statute." Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, Federal Gov-
ernment's Use of the RICO Statute and Other Efforts Against Organized Crime, S. REP.
No. 407, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1990); see also Organized Crime Hearings, supra, at
492, (testimony of David C. Williams, Director of Special Investigations, General Accounting
Office, including reprint of EFFECTrVENESS); The Mafia of 1980's: Divided and Under Siege,
N. Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at 1, col 1; Busting the Mob, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 3,
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F. Implementation of Private Civil RICO
The private bar did not begin to bring civil RICO suits until
about 1975. When it did, the district courts reacted with hostility;
they judicially attempted to redraft the statute in an effort to dis-
miss civil RICO suits.6 8 Indeed, before Sedima, sixty-one percent
of the suits recorded in the reported decisions were dismissed on
various grounds set forth in defendants' motions.,
The first attempt to redraft the statute sought to read an "or-
ganized crime" limitation into RICO. Because that limitation had
no support in the text of the statute, and had been specifically re-
jected in the legislative debates, the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits were fast to reject it.7° The next attempt involved
reading a "competitive injury" requirement into the statute. The
Seventh and Eighth Circuits discarded this limitation as well.7 1 Fi-
nally, the district courts developed the "racketeering injury" and
"criminal conviction" limitations. Both were repudiated by the Su-
preme Court.7 2
1986, at 24; The Mob on Trial, Newsday, Sept. 7, 1986, at 4, col. 1; see also A Battered and
Ailing Malice Is Losing its Grip on America: The Mob in Decline, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22,
1990, at A12, col. 1. "Law enforcement officials generally credit a long-term strategy adopted
by the Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the early 1980's:
developing cases against the top leader of organized-crime families and relying largely on
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or RICO, as a courtroom tool." Id.
68 See Horn, Judicial Plague Sweeps United States-"Result Orientis" Infects Civil
RICO Decisions, 5 Nat'l L.J., May 23, 1983, at 31, col. 1.
" See Trott Testimony, supra note 60, at 127.
70 Alcorn County, Miss. v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, 731 F.2d 1160, 1167 (5th Cir. 1984)
(cases cited).
1 See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1356-58 (7th Cir.) (competitive injury barrier
to recovery supported by neither language nor central goal of statute), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1002 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1058-59 (8th Cir.) (allegation of commercial...
injury not required by RICO), aff'd on rehearing, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
72 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488-500. The Second Circuit had suggested in its opinion
that civil RICO suits against "respected and legitimate 'enterprises,' were extraordinary, if
not outrageous." Sedima, 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985). In-
cluded among the so-called "legitimate" enterprises was E. F. Hutton. See id. But see Bus.
WEEK, Feb. 24, 1986, at 98, col. 1 (Hutton pleads guilty to 2,000 counts of mail fraud in
multi-million dollar bank scam); see also Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
747 F.2d 384, 395 n.14 (7th Cir. 1984) (white collar crime alleged in RICO complaints
against "'legitimate' businesses is in some ways at least as disturbing"), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606
(1985).
Those who consider RICO claims against "legitimate" businesses outrageous are appar-
ently unaware of the substantial body of literature on white-collar crime committed by "re-
spectable" businesses. See, e.g., Ross, How Lawless Are Big Companies?, FORTUNE, Dec. 1,
1980, at 57. The 1043 major corporate violations between 1970 and 1980 included: 117 con-
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II. OVERVIEW AND CRITIQUE
Discussions about RICO often are marred by a series of myths
that are not supported by a careful analysis of the statute, its legis-
lative history, or the facts.73 The pieces that make up this Sympo-
sium are no exception. The most persuasive myth is that RICO
was designed to combat only organized crime. 4 Closely following
the "Organized Crime Myth" is the "Legitimate Business Myth,"
which sees one purpose of the statute as its only purpose.7 5 Under-
lying each of these mistaken beliefs is the "Litigation Floodgate
Myth," which asserts, but does not document, the proposition that
civil RICO disputes are inundating the federal courts with an over-
whelming burden of new filings-or, in other words-every liti-
gated business dispute today includes a RICO count.76 This myth
may be restated as the "Garden Variety Fraud Myth."77 When
these myths are recognized and appropriately discounted, the
opinions offered in a number of the pieces that make up this Sym-
posium can themselves be appropriately discounted. 78 Indeed, a
major portion of their value may be in illustrating how thoroughly
these myths falsely color proposals for reform. Nevertheless, it re-
mains true, as Justice Holmes noted: "The first call of a theory of
law is that it should fit the facts. ' 79 Unfortunately, as this Sympo-
sium illustrates, too many do not.
The most significant of the six principal essays is that written
victions or consent decrees for 98 antitrust violations; 18 kickbacks, briberies or illegal re-
bates; 21 illegal political contributions; 11 frauds; and five tax evasions. See id. Such white-
collar crime has been called "'the most serious . . . crime problem in America today.'"
Braswel v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 115 n.9 (1988) (quoting Conyers, Corporate and
White-Collar Crime, 17 Aai. CPmM. L. Rxv. 287, 288 (1980)).
73 See generally Myths, supra note 2, at 860-923.
7" Id. at 860; see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
7' Myths, supra note 2, at 868; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
71 Myths, supra note 2, at 869. In fact, RICO criminal prosecutions, out of approxi-
mately 44,000 general criminal filings, account for only 110 cases per year; 48% are in the
political corruption and white-collar crime area, 39% are in the organized crime and labor
racketeering area, and 13% are in other areas, chiefly violent crime. Id. at 878, 1020. From
December, 1979 to January, 1988, civil RICO suits represented 0.156% of the total civil
filings. Id. at 878-79; see also id. at 870-73 (analysis of data and dispute on number of
hidden civil filings). Approximately 60% of the civil filings have an independent basis for
federal jurisdiction. See Equitable Relief, supra note 10, at 619.
7 See Myths, supra note 2, at 881.
7' See Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National City Bank, 253
N.Y. 23, 35, 170 N.E. 479, 483 (Cardozo, J.) ("opinion has a significance proportioned to the
sources that sustain it"), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 878 (1930).
79 0. HOLMES, Tim COMMON LAW 167 (Howe ed. 1963).
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by Philip A. Lacovara and David P. Nicoli. s0 Building on positions
80 Lacovara & Nicoli, Vicarious Criminal Liability of Organizations: RICO as an Ex-
ample of a Flawed Principle in Practice, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 725 (1990).
In 1965, Justice Douglas suggested the adoption of an editorial policy requiring each
author of a law review essay to indicate his special interest in the subject matter of his
article. Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REv. 227, 229 (1965). Read-
ers of this Symposium ought to be aware that Mr. Lacovara is the principal spokesman for
the Business/Labor Coalition for Civil RICO Reform and was senior counsel for litigation
and legal policy of General Electric ("G.E."). See Myths, supra note 2, at 870 n.47. One of
the biggest beneficiaries of RICO reform legislation, if it were made retroactive, as initially
proposed, but subsequently dropped after public outcry, would be G.E., which is being sued
under civil RICO for $1 billion by the Washington Public Power Supply System over the
construction of a nuclear containment unit. See Dwyer, Business May Have Found a Way
to Delay RICO, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 28, 1989, at 26. The Lacovara and Nicoli proposals recall
the remarks of Justice Brandeis in 1905, who was then in private practice: "We hear much
of the 'corporate lawyer' and far too little of the 'people's lawyer.' The great opportunity of
the American bar is and will be to stand again, as it has in the past, ready to protect also
the interests of the people." A. MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE 30 (1933) (quoting
speech before Harvard Ethical Society); see also N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1990, at A 12, col. 1.
(elderly investor, accountant, who spent life savings on worthless junk bonds from Charles
H. Keating's Lincoln Savings and Loan Ass'n and who was plaintiff in civil RICO suit, com-
mented in suicide note: "There's nothing left for me of things that used to be. Government
is supposed to serve and protect, but who? Those who can gather the most savings from
retired people.").
Lacovara's and Nicoli's proposed restrictions on entity liability might also redound to
G.E.'s financial benefit in the future. See Dwyer, Business May Have Found a Way to De-
lay RICO, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 28, 1989, at 26. An examination of a past incident might demon-
strate how. In 1961, G.E. and 29 other electrical equipment manufacturers, together control-
ling 95% of the market, were convicted of conspiracy to fix prices. Middle-level executives
were also convicted, but company presidents, denying all knowledge of the conspiracy and
claiming that it violated company policy, were neither convicted nor indicted. Watkins,
Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Their Implications for Government and for Busi-
ness, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 106-10 (1961). Although the conspiracy inflicted an estimated $2
billion in damages on equipment purchasers, the subsequent civil suits for treble damages
under the antitrust laws recovered only $600 million. Moreover, most of the offending of-
ficers retained their positions or moved to equivalent positions elsewhere. See C. WALTON &
F. CLEVELAND, CORPORATIONS ON TRIAL: THE ELECTRIC CASES (1964). Derivative suits against
the corporate directors for negligent supervision were generally unsuccessful. See, e.g., Gra-
ham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 86, 188 A.2d 125, 131 (1963) (defendant
directors without duty to look for wrongdoing when unaware of employees' violations of
antitrust laws).
The companies, G.E. in particular, were then managed by the so-called "rule of antici-
pated reaction," which permits superiors to command only by correcting subordinates. See
SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 129-30 (2d ed. 1957). "[M]anagers [were] required to show
a profit or be dismissed." N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1961, at 26 (describing "Cordiner Plan,"
named after Ralph W. Cordiner, G.E.'s Chairman of the Board). It is doubtful that the
outcome of the 1961 scandal-hardly fully satisfactory from society's perspective-would be
improved under Lacovara's and Nicoli's new regime of even more limited corporate civil and
criminal responsibility. For further discussion on the G.E. litigation, see generally C. WAL-
TON & F. CLEVELAND, supra.
Lacovara's and Nicoli's proposals would be more credible if actually tested by their
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taken by the American Law Institute in its influential Model Penal
Code,81 and the National Commission on Reform of Federal Crimi-
nal Law,8 2 Lacovara and Nicoli persuasively argue that some modi-
fication of the current doctrine of entity criminal responsibility
may be in order. In particular, in the context of RICO, they argue
that limits should be adopted on the parallel doctrine of entity
civil responsibility. For them, courts should not find entity respon-
comprehensive application to major corporate scandals, such as the recent E.F. Hutton
bank-fraud caper. See J. STERNGAD, BURNING THE HOUSE DOWN: How GREP., CONCEIT, AND
BITTER REVENGE DESTROYED E.F. HUTTON passim (1990); M. STEVENS, SUDDEN DEATH: THE
RISE AND FALL OF E.F. HUTrON passim (1989). If the proposals produced defensible and
desirable outcomes, Congress might want to consider adopting them. If not, Congress should
either modify them appropriately or reject them completely. Nonetheless, presented only as
conventional legal reasoning (as here), the authors do not supply sufficient information to
allow an assessment of their wisdom or folly. In any event, the courts should not adopt the
proposals, in light of Article II's limitations on legislative activity by courts. See infra note
93 and accompanying text.
8' MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (Official Draft 1962).
82 FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
§ 402 (1971). The Commission, however, was not of one mind. Some members of the Com-
mission believed that "criminal liability of corporations poses issues quite different from
ordinary accomplice liability of individuals." Id. at 35. "The diffusion of responsibilities ne-
cessitates more flexible attribution of criminality to artificial entities not subject to grave
penalties like imprisonment." Id. The Senate Judiciary Committee, which reported compre-
hensive criminal code reform legislation in 1979, rejected the approaches of the Model Penal
Code and the Commission, opting to retain present law. S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 79-83 (1980). Restricting corporate criminal liability, in short, failed to command polit-
ical support when tested in comprehensive legislative hearings. The arguments have also
failed to convince the judiciary. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 360 Mass.
188, 233-61, 275 N.E.2d 33, 78-106 (1971) (criminal liability of corporation based on acts of
officers, directors, and employees to bribe or conspiracy to bribe public official), cert. de-
nied, 407 U.S. 914 (1972). If anything, the law needs to be strengthened. See J. CONKLIN,
ILLEGAL BUT NOT CRIMINAL: BUSINESS CRIME IN AMERICA 129 (1977).
[T]he criminal justice system treats business offenders with leniency. Prosecution
is uncommon, conviction is rare, and harsh sentences almost nonexistent. At most,
a businessman or corporation is fined; few individuals are imprisoned and those
who are serve very short sentences. Many reasons exist for this leniency. The
wealth and prestige of businessmen, their influence over the media, the trend to-
ward more lenient punishment for all offenders, the complexity and invisibility of
many business crimes, the existence of regulatory agencies and inspectors who
seek compliance with the law rather than punishment of violators all help explain
why the criminal justice system rarely deals harshly with businessmen. This fail-
ure to punish business offenders may encourage "feelings of mistrust, lower com-
munity morality, and general social disorganization" in the general population.
Discriminatory justice may also provide lower-class and working-class individuals
with justifications for their own violation of the law, and it may provide political
radicals with a desire to replace a corrupt system in which equal justice is little
more than a spoken ideal.
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sibility, criminally or civilly, unless high managerial involvement
can be demonstrated by the prosecutor or the plaintiff.13
They further argue for the extension of the "person-enter-
prise" rule in RICO actions, which, as they note,84 is the majority
position under 18 United States Code section 1962(c). 5 While in a
"minority of one,"88 the Eleventh Circuit's position, however, is
correct, and in good, although unexpected, company. 7
Ostensibly, the "person-enterprise" rule stems from two prin-
cipal considerations, neither of which justify it. First, it is said to
be rooted in a belief that an enterprise cannot, under the language
of the statute, be "employed or associated with" itself.88 To be
"self-associated" may be a strain on the normal use of words, but
to be "self-employed" hardly departs from standard usage. Second,
the rule is said to reflect unease at the prospect of holding an en-
terprise liable, when it is the victim of the racketeering.8 9 "[T]his
hardly seems a reason to fashion a general rule that applies even
when the enterprise is not the victim, but is instead the perpetra-
83 See Lacovara & Nicoli, supra note 80, at 745-50; see also Myths, supra note 2, at 942
(restricting multiple damages and authorizing counsel fees in context of affirmative defense
might make sense), 223 (suggested statutory text); compare Elkins, Corporations and Crim-
inal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky. L.J. 73, 119-21 (1976) (criticism of due diligence
defense) with Miller, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Principle Extended to Its Limits, 38
FED. B.J. 49 (1979) (support of due diligence defense).
" For a comprehensive examination of the development and rationale of the "person-
enterprise" rule, see Note, Innocence by Association: Entities and the Person-Enterprise
Rule Under RICO, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 179, 189-98 (1988).
88 See Lacovara & Nicoli, supra note 80, at 752-59; see also Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v.
Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 913 F.2d 948, 951 (D.C. Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, No. 90-872 (Dec. 3, 1990).
86 Yellow Bus Lines, 913 F.2d at 951; see United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988-89
(11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983). In Hartley, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that to read "person" separate from "enterprise" would permit a
corporation to evade punishment. Id.
87 Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force, A.B.A. SEc. ON CORP., BANKING AND
Bus. LAW 366-77 (1985) [hereinafter A.B.A. Report] (noting six substantial reasons support-
ing the Eleventh Circuit's position).
8 See, e.g., Yellow Bus Lines, 913 F.2d at 951 ("Logic alone dictates that one person
may not serve as the enterprise and the person associated with it because . . . 'you cannot
associate with yourself") (quoting district court opinion, 839 F.2d at 790); Schofield v. First
Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 29-34 (1st Cir. 1986) ("person" engaging in pattern of racke-
teering activity must be "distinct" from enterprise).
89 See, e.g., B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Ref. Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1984) (RICO
meant to punish infiltrating criminals rather than legitimate businesses). But cf. United
States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, 871 F.2d 401, 405-06 (3d Cir.
1989) (person-enterprise rule limited to § 1964(c) claims for damages; inapplicable to
§ 1964(a) suits for equitable relief).
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tor."90 Moreover, the victim exclusion rule, not considered by La-
covara and Nicoli, would work, independent of any special RICO
rule, to preclude secondary liability for enterprises when they are
victims or merely passive instruments.91 As such, the "person-en-
terprise" rule is neither necessary nor wise, and it unjustifiably cir-
cumscribes RICO's proper scope in holding a perpetrator responsi-
ble-criminally and civilly-for his conduct.
More generally, Lacovara's and Nicoli's proposal that the
courts adopt a high managerial agent theory of criminal and civil
responsibility runs into Article III limitations. In 1948, Congress
codified entity liability. 92 Only Congress, therefore, can change it.
"RICO may be a poorly drafted statute, but rewriting it [or enact-
ing a new general theory of entity liability under Title 18] is a job
for Congress, if it is so inclined and not for the courts. '93
90 ABA Report, supra note 87, at 374 n.607. The offender and the enterprise need not
necessarily be separate-they may be identical. Id.; see also Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc.,
896 F.2d 833, 840-42 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (person-enterprise rule under § 1962(a) aban-
doned in light of "universal" rejection based on "compelling" reasoning).
"' See Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 119, 120-21 n.5 (1932) (woman's acquies-
cence to transportation in violation of Mann Act not crime of conspiracy to transport, of
which man alone can be guilty); United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 822-24 (2d Cir. 1990)
(evidence that restaurant consultant was conduit of extorted money does not demonstrate
active participation in extortion scheme); W. LAFAvE & A. Sco2-r, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAw 594-96 (2d ed. 1986).
". 1 U.S.C. § 1, enacted at 62 Stat. 859-60 (1948); see United States v. A&P Trucking
Co., 358 U.S. 121, 123 n.2 (1958). "It is significant that the definition of 'whoever' in 1 U.S.C
§ 1 [to include entities] was first enacted into law as part of the very same statute which
enacted into positive law the revised Criminal Code [in Title 18] (citation omitted). The
connection between... [it and Title 18] is thus more than a token one ...... Id.; see also
United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 906-09 (9th Cir. 1974) (context makes entity theory of
liability applicable), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975). See generally S. REP. No. 1620, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1948); H.R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (use of "whoever"), 9
("preserve the original meaning"), app. 454 ("whoever" and "person" "synonymous,"
"phrased in positive instead of permissive terms") (1947). The development of the general
federal rule of criminal and civil entities' responsibility is traced to and was upheld in New
York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909) (no valid objec-
tion in law, and every reason in public policy, to hold corporation, profiting from actions of
its agents and officers, punishable by fine because of "knowledge and intent of its agents to
whom it has intrusted authority to act"); Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 U.S. 256, 261
(1885) (when acts are not founded on contract, but on tortious or quasi-criminal exercises of
power corporation may be held pecuniarily responsible to injured party); and United States
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823, 835-36 (Cir. Ct. S.D.N.Y. 1906) (antitrust criminal
conspiracy upheld).
93 H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2905 (1989); Sedima, 473
U.S. at 500 (inappropriate for courts to amend statute); Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation
and Impropriety of Judicial Restrictions, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1101, 1118-21 (1982) (RICO
better addressed by Congress than courts); see also Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981) (regardless of arguments' merits this is matter for Congress, not
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Like Lacovara and Nicoli, Robert D. Luskin is deeply dissatis-
fied with RICO. 4 His essay, which relies heavily on Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
Co.,9 5 raises a constitutional challenge: void for vagueness. Luskin,
however, is disenchanted with more than RICO; he also calls into
question well-settled aspects of the void-for-vagueness jurispru-
dence of the Supreme Court, including the general rule that, ab-
sent first amendment considerations, such challenges are enter-
tained only on an "as-applied" basis.96 He also ignores other well-
established principles mandating that even where successful, such
challenges should result in only partial invalidity.9 7 Finally, Mr.
Luskin ignores the implications of United States v. Batchelder,"
which deals with uncertainty in the combined application of one or
more statutes.9 At bottom, however, the Luskin essay is unsatisfy-
courts, to resolve); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748 (1975) ("the
Judiciary may not circumscribe a right which Congress has conferred because of any disa-
greement it might have with Congress about the wisdom of... expansive... liability").
But see K&S Partnership v. Continental Bank, 913 F.2d 1296, 1302-05 (8th Cir. 1990)
(RICO liability requires showing that corporation had knowledge of scheme and provided
substantial assistance in violation). The Eighth Circuit's position is inconsistent with rea-
soning articulated by the Supreme Court and other circuit courts. See, e.g., American Soc'y
of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 573-74 (1984) (vicarious liability
available under antitrust laws); Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349,
1356-62 (3d Cir. 1987) (respondeat superior, and aiding and abetting liability available
under RICO); Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798, 811 (D. Md. 1985) (corporation or part-
nership can be held liable for acts of agents in scope of authority), afl'd, 888 F.2d 1006, 1008
(4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Local 560, IBT, 581 F. Supp. 279, 332 n.30, 337 (D.N.J.
1984) (union executive board aided and abetted extortionist act and satisfied RICO's predi-
cate requirement), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267, 284 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
" See Luskin, Behold, The Day of Judgment: Is the RICO Pattern Requirement Void
for Vagueness?, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 779 passim (1990).
' 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2906-09 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
501 (1982) (court should uphold vagueness challenge only if enactment is impermissibly
vague in all applications).
7 See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503-04 (1985) (even in first
amendment area, "normal rule" of partial, rather than facial invalidity is required course).
:8 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
9 Id. at 123-25 (vagueness not present where two statutes, each with differing penalty,
apply, since defendant knows maximum, and no more doubt present than when statute per-
mits alternative punishments). If Batchelder is good law, uncertainty regarding whether
RICO, or one of its predicate offenses, or both, is applicable to a defendant's conduct does
not produce a valid void-for-vagueness objection. The line is drawn at the predicate of-
fenses. If the predicate offenses are "not unconstitutionally vague, [then RICO] cannot be
vague either." Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 54-58 (1989); see also S. REP.
No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) ("no due process constitutional barrier .. . [be-
cause] any proscribed act ... must violate an independent statute"). But a statute, includ-
ing RICO, is not vague, in the constitutional sense, merely because it is difficult to deter-
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ing for more fundamental reasons. Luskin conflates breadth, ambi-
guity, and vagueness. 100 As such, he confuses that kind of uncer-
tainty of application that stems from breadth of meaning caused
by the use of broad terms, that kind of uncertainty of application
that stems from multiplicity of meaning caused by ambiguity, and
that kind of impossibility of application that stems from vagueness
caused by the use of terms having no meaning at all. In fact, RICO
is neither ambiguous nor vague; it is broad,101 and breadth raises a
question of policy, not constitutionality. Here, too, the objection
belongs before Congress, not the courts.
The essay by Steven L. Kessler, 102 in which he compares and
contrasts RICO with New York's Organized Crime Control Act of
1986, is reminiscent of Steinberg's famous New Yorker cover, illus-
trating the dictum that civilization ends at the Hudson River. At
each point of difference, Kessler offers his confident judgment that
mine if "marginal" cases fall within it. United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 93 (1975).
Vagueness is present only when the terms employed have "no core" meaning. Village of
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7 (emphasis in original). Those who engage in a pattern
of predicate criminal offenses that are themselves not vague can hardly complain in "sur-
prised innocence" when their behavior is found unlawful. United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S.
513, 523-24 (1942); United States v. Masters, No 89-2851, & slip. op. at 6 (7th Cir. Feb. 6,
1991) ("provided the statutes criminalizing the predicate acts are not unconstitutionally
vague... the defendants are on adequate notice.... ."); see, e.g., United States v. Glecier,
No. 88-3417, slip op. at 2 n.1 (7th Cir. Jan. 8, 1991) ("RICO statute is not unconstitutional
despite Justice Scalia's statements"); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1102-05 (3d
Cir. 1990) (not vague); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1179 (1st Cir.) (term "pat-
tern" as applied "not even ... close" to being vague to render statute void), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 130 (1990). Finally, the strict construction rule is not applicable to RICO since
Congress mandated that RICO be "liberally construed." Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 947 (1970). The strict construction rule is merely "a
principle of [statutory] construction," Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 121, "a long-established prac-
tice," Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979), or "a maxim of construction," United
States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379 (1978). It is not a rule of constitutional dimension.
Tarrant v. Ponte, 751 F.2d 459, 465-66 (1st Cir. 1985). As such, Congress may abrogate its
application, subject only to the constitutional doctrine of void-for-vagueness. See generally
Note, "Mother of Mercy-Is This the End of RICO"-Justice Scalia Invites Constitutional
Void for Vagueness Challenge to RICO Pattern, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1106 (1990).
100 See generally R. DICKERSON, FuN AmErrALs OF LEGAL DRAFTING 22-33 (1965) (anal-
ysis of "major diseases of language": ambiguity, vagueness and generality); Blakey, Is Pat-
tern Void for Vagueness?, 5 Civil RICO Rep. 6 (Dec. 12, 1989); Williams, Language and the
Law, 61 L.Q. REv. 71, 82-86 (1945) (four parts) (classic analysis of semantics and legal
usage).
10I See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 (RICO "demonstrates breadth," not "ambiguity") (cit-
ing Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir.
1984), afl'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)).
102 Kessler, And a Little Child Shall Lead Them: New York's Organized Crime Control
Act of 1986, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. Rlv. 797 (1990).
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the New York statute represents better public policy.103 It would
have been more instructive if he had made a similar comparison of
the other twenty-eight state RICO statutes.10 4 Had he done so, the
starkness of New York's unique view would have been cast in
sharper contrast. Similarly, the view that New York's law offers
adequate protection, criminally or civilly, against white-collar
crime is a proposition to be proven, not merely asserted. Time,
however, will be the best judge of Kessler's position. No one
doubts that organized crime, at least in the narrow sense of Mafia
families, is centered in New York.105 Law enforcement authorities
in New York are among the most sophisticated in the nation. Fed-
eral RICO is generally credited with making a major difference in
how organized crime is prosecuted in the federal system.106 If a
similar track record is not achieved under the New York statute,
objective observers ought to question whether New York passed an
organized crime control act in name only.
John M. Nonna's and Melissa P. Corrado's essay on RICO re-
form requires little comment. 07 It is a workmanlike effort to re-
view the major issues in the Senate bill, which, for reasons not un-
related to those articulated by Nonna and Corrado, appear to be
dead. Hopefully, they will turn their attention next to the House
bill. 08
Professor Laura Ginger'0 9 and Yolanda Eleni Stefanou" 0 sepa-
rately concentrate their attention on more narrowly focused topics.
Professor Ginger surveys the confusing and contradictory jurispru-
dence of standing and causation under RICO. Her competent anal-
ysis makes it possible for all plainly to see the extent to which the
lower courts are departing from the text of the statute, particularly
its liberal construction directive, and its express legislative history,
103 Id. passim.
104 See Myths, supra note 2, at 988 (chart of state statutes).
105 See A Battered and Ailing Mafia Is Losing Its Grip on America: The Mob Decline,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1990, at A12.
100 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
107 Nonna & Corrado, RICO Reform: "Weeding Out" Garden Variety Disputes Under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 825 (1990).
108 H.R. 5111, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Hughes, RICO Reform, How Much Is
Needed?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 639, 645-47 (1990) (discussion of proposals before introduction of
H.R. 5111).
109 Ginger, Causation and Civil RICO Standing: When Is a Plaintiff Injured "By Rea-
son of" a RICO Violation?, 64 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 849 (1990).
110 Stefanou, Concurrent Jurisdiction Over Federal Civil RICO Claims: Is It Workable?
An Analysis of Tafflin v. Levitt, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 877 (1990).
[Vol. 64:701
1990] FOREWORD
as well as the teachings of the Supreme Court in Sedima and
Haroco."11 Only two comments are in order. First, her essay would
be more candid if she explicitly acknowledged what her analysis
demonstrates: conventional legal reasoning cannot adequately ex-
plain the divergent views of the courts. Extrajudicial considera-
tions are at work, be they legitimate concerns with docket"2 or ille-
gitimate concerns with another view of justice.13 Second, her call
II Ginger, supra note 109, passim. The developing jurisprudence under 18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1962(d) that would narrowly restrict standing under RICO, noted by Professor Ginger,
is also inconsistent with the general approach followed under the common law and other
federal statutes. As such, it is particularly hard to justify a narrow reading of RICO, since it
is one of the only statutory provisions that has an explicit liberal construction directive.
Under the common law, once a conspiracy is shown, any injury inflicted by an overt act
to further the conspiracy is civilly cognizable. See Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165, 182 (1913)
("the well-settled rule is that no civil action lies for conspiracy unless there be an overt act
that results in damage to the plaintiff"); Kashi v. Gratsos, 790 F.2d 1050, 1054 (2d Cir. 1986)
(in common-law fraud action defendant liable to full extent, not limited to personal involve-
ment); Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 944 (6th Cir. 1985) (requiring only that act in further-
ance of conspiracy injured plaintiff); Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 487 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (discussing potential civil liability of conspirator); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs §
876(a) (1971) (persons acting in concert act "pursuant to a common design"); id. § 876(a)
comment b (term "conspiracy" used in connection with such common design). Conspiracy is
not the basis of the claim; it is the injury that flows from an overt act that forms the basis
for compensation. Id. The rule is universally followed without difficulty by the district
courts. See, e.g., United States v. Excellair, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 1377, 1388 n.7 (D. Colo. 1986);
Weise v. Reisner, 318 F. Supp. 580, 583 (E.D. Wis. 1970). Litigation under federal statutes
follows a similar uniform path. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 103 (1971)
(Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)); Lyon v. Ranger MI, 858 F.2d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1988)
(each defendant liable as participant in "concert of action" under maritime law "not only
for his own acts but also for the acts of others with whom he acts in concert"); Simeon v. T.
Smith & Son, Inc., 852 F.2d 1421, 1430-32 (5th Cir. 1988) (Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688) (not
limited to percentage of fault), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker
Co., 740 F.2d 739, 744 (9th Cir. 1984) (antitrust), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985);
Beltz Travel Serv., Inc. v. International Air Transp. Ass'n, 620 F.2d 1360, 1366-67 (9th Cir.
1980) (all members of antitrust conspiracy liable regardless of nature of own actions); Fergu-
son v. OrniMedia, Inc., 469 F.2d 194, 197 (1st Cir. 1972) (defendant liable for engaging in
conspiracy although not participant in acts causing harm); Herpich v. Wilder, 430 F.2d 818,
819 (5th Cir. 1970) ("having allegedly joined the conspiracy and taken steps to assure its
success, [defendant] may be held responsible for the acts of his coconspirators in further-
ance of their scheme"), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971); International Longshoremen's
Union v. Joneau Spruce Corp., 189 F.2d 177, 189-90 (9th Cir. 1951) (Taft-Hartley Act, 29
U.S.C. § 187(b)), aff'd on other grounds, 342 U.S. 237 (1952); Donahue v. Pendleton Woolen
Mills, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1423, 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (antitrust).
112 See, e.g., Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice, 21 ST. MARY's L.J. 5, 9-13 (1989)
(discussing reform of diversity jurisdiction and civil RICO).
113 See, e.g., Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the Ma-
nipulation of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 321 passim (1989) (current federal
docket clearing practices are unprincipled and inconsistent in exclusion of certain under-
represented classes from federal forum).
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for congressional action reflects a view of the congressional process
that is not supported by the record. RICO reformers are not trying
to clarify the law to vindicate the rights of those injured by con-
duct falling within its scope. Rather, like the courts her survey cov-
ers, they are trying, even retroactively, to narrow RICO." 4 Thus, it
is not likely that Congress will act on her well-taken
recommendations.
Stefanou's examination of the issue of exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction is both comprehensive in scope and persuasive in its
conclusion. 115 Except for a unanimous Supreme Court,"' she is
also in good company." 7 Congress is likely, when it passes RICO
reform legislation, to confine jurisdiction under the statute to the
federal courts.118
III. CONCLUSION
It is a matter of speculation whether RICO, the federal stat-
ute, was named after Rico, the film character."' Be that as it may,
the statute was designed to change the ending of the movie. Rico,
the film character, died at the hands of the police. The only due
process he received was that of alley justice. A less memorable
114 Stein, Don't Mess with RICO-Congress Should Spurn Effort to Curb It, BARRON'S,
July 3, 1989, at 14, col. 3. This article explains:
[P]owerful people who are accustomed to stealing in peace ... are now trying to
buy retroactive immunity for their wrongs through powerful efforts spear headed
by Sen. Dennis DeConcini of Arizona, who is a beneficiary of contributions from
Charles Keating and his friends and who helped keep Keating's wildly misman-
aged Lincoln S&L alive longer so that it could buy more Milken junk, speculate
more in real estate, cost the taxpayers more, and lose hundreds of millions of dol-
lars of debenture holders' money .... The Congress, like a Dark Ages pope, will
grant retroactive indulgences, plenary and eternal, for fraud, bribery, looting, in-
side trading, cheating the government, and stock manipulation-with no counter-
vailing gain at all except to the treasuries of individual legislators.
Id. at 14-15, cols. 3-4.
I'l See Stefanou, supra note 110.
116 See Tafflin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792, 794-95 (1990) (concurrent jurisdiction over civil
RICO claims).
117 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 23-24 (1988) (exclusive jurisdiction is appropriate,
"since many of the predicate acts involve violation of federal statutes exclusively enforced
by federal courts").
118 See, e.g., H.R. No. 1046, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1989) (exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion over RICO).
11 See, e.g., Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 21 n.1 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (Shadur, J.) ("[tihis Court has always suspected the person who christened the legis-
lation was a movie buff with a sense of humor").
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character in the film was "Big Boy," the upperworld figure behind
Robinson's underworld character. 120 Big Boy, however, was neither
shot by the police nor prosecuted under the law. RICO was, in fact,
designed to change that result. RICO is not, in short, just for those
whose names end in vowels.
In April of 1990, Michael R. Milken, the "junk bond king,"
pleaded guilty to numerous violations of the federal securities
laws.12' RICO was a key element in his investigation and prosecu-
tion."2 ' He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment in November
of 1990.12 s RICO, in short, stands for equal protection under the
120 See Myths, supra note 2, at 984 n.440.
121 Milken Pleads Guilty to Six Felony Counts, Wall St. J., April 25, 1990, at A12, col.
1 (reporting pleading to defrauding investors, cheating clients, taking unlawful secret posi-
tions in stock, aiding income tax evasion, illegally concealing true ownership, and evading
net-capital rules and settling for $600 million, $200 million in fines and $400 million for
fund to compensate victims). The pleas "were far from" technical violations of obscure se-
curities laws .... they portray[ed] a financier . . . that.., seemed to believe himself
beyond the reach of law... ." Id. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh characterized the
offenses as "some of the most serious efforts undertaken to ... subvert Wall Street's securi-
ties worksets." Id. at A12. Harvey Pitt, a leading securities lawyer, noted, "[The plea] vindi-
cates the whole prosecutorial effort. . . ." Plea Bargains Merit Balance Rewards vs. Risks
in Settlements Such as Milken, Wall St. J., April 24, 1990, at B9, col. 1. Richard C. Brieden,
the chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, commented, "Despite the effort
to mold public opinion,... [the plea] demonstrate[s] that... [Milken] stood at the center
of a network of manipulation, fraud and deceit." SEC Chief Calling for Long Term, N.Y.
Times, April 25, 1990, at C7, col. 4. In pleading guilty, Milken acknowledged that he "was
wrong ... and knew... [it] at the time." Text of Statement to Court Describing 6 Felo-
nies, N.Y. Times, April 25, 1990. In pleading not guilty four years ago, he said, "I am confi-
dent that in the end I will be vindicated." Friends Defend Junk-bond King, The Detroit
News,.April 22, 1990, at 3A, col 2. (reporting that evidence that led to Milken's plea bar-
gains began with single-page letter in broken English that arrived at Merril Lynch firm in
May, 1985 but ultimately culminated in at least a dozen witnesses close to Milken who gave
prosecutors their case); see also How Michael Milken Was Forced to Accept the Prospects
of Guilt, Wall St. J., April 23, 1990, at 1, col 6 (reporting grand jury was about to return
superseding indictment including new charges of insider trading, bribery, cheating custom-
ers, and destroying inciminating evidence). The public accounting is not over. See Rep.
Dingell to Call Milken, N.Y. Times, April 26, 1990 at C8, col. 2. (reporting that House
Energy and Commerce Committee would ask Milken to return and complete his testimony).
122 See generally C. BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BALL: THE INSIDE STORY OF DREXEL BURN-
HAM AND THE RISE OF THE JUNK BOND RAIDERS 360-72 (1989); Myths, supra note 2, at 895
n.119 (analysis of bankruptcy of Drexel Burnham Lambert, "Ponzi" scheme, and RICO).
123 N.Y. Times, Nov 21, 1990, at 1 col 10. But see N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1991, at 1, col. 1
(Judge recommended that Milkin be eligible for parole after three years). Harvey Pitt, a
leading securities lawyer, commented: "Judge Wood is 100 percent right, and her sentence is
a fitting conclusion to about four years of denials and obstruction of the Government's pros-
ecution." N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1990, at D4, col 2. Richard C. Breeden, the chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, added, "This sentence should send the message that
criminal misconduct in our financial markets will not be tolerated, regardless of one's wealth
or power." Id. Elmer W. Johnson, a lawyer and former executive vice president, General
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law-from Mulberry Street'" to Wall Street. 2 '
Motors Corp., also commented, "The stiff sentence was necessary. I am not proud of my
profession and its role in the credit binge of the 80's. Many of the excesses could not have
occurred but for the readiness of some of our most brilliant lawyers to prostitute themselves
for large fees." Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1990, at B1, col 2.
Rep. John Dingell, chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, placed
the sentence in a broader context:
The Milken sentence appears substantial, but only because the sentences in so
many other financial manipulation and fraud cases have been so genteel. Its ap-
parent harshness is more illusion than reality. The harsh fact of the matter is that
it will take the American public much longer than 10 years and much more than
$600 million to pay for the mess these financial engineering schemes have left
behind in our savings and loans, our insurance firms, our pension funds and our
once-healthy corporations.
Id. In January, 1991, federal banking regulators filed a $6 billion suit against Milkin for
allegedly manipulating the market by inflating junk bond pricing and creating "an illusion
of liquidity" in violation of antitrust laws and federal RICO. See Milkin and S. & L. Execu-
tives Sued, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1991, at 23, cols. 2-3. Other defendants named include
savings executives Charles H. Keating, Jr. of Lincoln Savings & Loan, David L. Paul of
CenTrust Savings Bank, and Thomas P. Spiegel of Columbia Savings & Loan. Id. at col. 2;
see also FDIC Suit Accuses Milken, Others of Duping S & Ls; Seeks $6 Billion, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 21, 1991, at B4, col. 2 (suit seeks treble damages under RICO); U.S. Filing $6.8 Billion
Drexel Claim, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1990, at C1, col. 6 (federal regulators in RICO suit for
"willfully plundering" more than forty failed thrifts through bribery, extortion and fraud);
Junks King's Legacy: Milken Sale Pitch on High-Yield Bonds is Contradicted by Data,
Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1989, at 1, col. 6 (reporting junk bonds did not perform as Milken
promised); Did Junk Bonds Help Small Businesses? Sometimes But Not As Much As
Claimed, Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1989, at A15, col. 1.
224 The Ravenite Social Club on Mulberry Street in Manhattan's Little Italy allegedly
functions for organized crime as does the New York Stock Exchange on Wall Street in Man-
hattan's financial district for the securities industry. See R. BLUMENTHAL, THE LAST DAYS OF
THE SICILIANS: THE FBI's WAR AGAINST THE MAFIA 16 (1989).
225 See generally From Milken to the Mafia, BARRON'S, Nov. 26, 1990, at 12, 25-26. In
an excerpt of an interview with former United States Attorney for the Southern District of
New York Rudolph Giuliani, the following comments were made:
Q: There has been an enormous criticism of RICO and of your use of RICO.
A: The racketeering statute has been used.., infrequently in white-collar cases.
[But] there is no doubt that it was intended from the very beginning to be used
for major white-collar crime.
Q: Not just for the mob, in other words.
A: The legislative history of the statute makes it quite clear that it was intended
to be applied beyond just the mob. That is the reason why white-collar crimes
were included in the statute, crimes such as wire fraud and mail fraud. They
weren't added; they were included right from the very beginning. And what the
critics confuse is motivation and intent. The motivation for that statute going
back seven, eight, nine years, was to deal with organized crime. However, in debat-
ing and drafting and expanding it, the intent of it was essentially to deal with all
forms of substantial, ongoing enterprise crime. Where people, in essence, create a
formal or informal business to commit substantial crime-whether it is fraud or
bribery or extortion. And the real fairness or unfairness in the application of the
statute is whether or not you are actually using it to deal with major-league ...
substantial crime. Crime that is conducted like an enterprise, rather than just in-
dividuals committing crimes here and there.
Id.; see also M. Puzo, THE GODFATHER 52 (1969) (Don Corleone: "A lawyer with his brief-
case can steal more than a hundred men with guns").
